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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 46 DECEMBER 1971 NUMBER 2
NLRB BARGAINING ORDERS SINCE GISSEL:
WANDERING FROM A LANDMARK
BERTRAND B. POGREBIN*
THE GOOD FAITH DOUBT TEST
The NLRB's abandonment of the good faith doubt test, in refusal
to bargain cases, should have been one of those rare moments in the
development of the labor law when both labor and management could
applaud - and for the same reasons.'
That test, as articulated in Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB,2 provided
that an employer confronted by a union demand for recognition could
not refuse to recognize the union unless he held a good faith doubt as
to the union's majority status. Further, if, after refusing recognition,
the employer committed unfair labor practices, these would be the basis
for the "retrospective divination" that his original refusal was not
based on good faith doubt but rather was motivated "by a rejection of
the collective bargaining principal or by a desire to gain time within
which to undermine the union (sic)."' 3 Such a finding, coupled with a
showing that the union had authorization cards from a majority of the
employees at the time of its demand, constituted a refusal to bargain
ruling and a bargaining order.4 This same result could obtain even
*A.B., Rutgers University; LL.B., Harvard University. Member, New York and
Federal Bars. I am indebted to Joel H. Golovensky and Frederick D. Braid for their
assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 The abandonment of this entrenched Board standard which applied essentially for
more than twenty years occurred during oral argument before the Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, reh'g denied, 896 U.S. 869 (1969).
2 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enrd, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
914 (1951); see Artcraft Hosiery Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948); Matter of R.J. Lovvorn,
76 N.L.R.B. 84 (1948); cf. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
3 85 N.L.R.B. at 1264, quoting Artcraft Hosiery Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 333, 334 (1948);
accord, Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
4 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, establishes the
right of employees to organize and bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). Should
a dispute arise as to whether or not an individual is the designated representative of a
group of employees, the NLRB's election procedure may be invoked pursuant to section
9(c)(1) of the NLRA, as amended. Id. § 159(c)(1). Once there is an employee representative,
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
though the NLRB had conducted an election which the union lost.5
The main objection to the Joy Silk test was that it made the em-
ployer's state of mind at the time of his refusal to recognize determina-
tive of the employees' right to vote on the issue of representation in a
secret ballot election. In defense of this clear subordination of a pri-
mary purpose of the NLRA, it was reasoned that to do otherwise would
allow the employer to enjoy the fruits of his unfair labor practices and
thus encourage such violative tactics. Further, it was advanced, a bar-
gaining order was the only really effective deterrent to such employer
unfair labor practices." However, the logic of the good faith doubt test
carried its application to situations where the employer committed no
unfair labor practices, but revealed, by words or acts that he had no
doubt as to the union's majority. Here too, the Board imposed a bar-
gaining order.7 Moreover, given a literal examination, the Joy Silk
reasoning was illogical insofar as the occurrence of unfair labor prac-
tices following a demand for recognition was just as consistent with a
desire to prevent the union from achieving a majority as with a desire
the employer and employee representative are mutually obligated to bargain in good faith.
Id. § 158(a)(5) & (b)(3). If either party fails to fulfill this obligation, the Board is authorized
to order the delinquent party to bargain Id. § 160(c).
The role that authorization cards play in the procedure briefly described above is as
follows. For a union to obtain an election on its own petition pursuant to section 9(c)(1), it
must establish that it has the support of at least thirty percent of the employees in the
unit it is seeking to represent. NLRB RULES AND REGULATIONS § 101.18(a) (1965). Ordinarily,
the evidence of such thirty percent support is in the form of cards, solicited from and
signed by individual employees, which bear language on their face to the effect that each
individual signer authorizes the union to represent him for collective bargaining purposes.
If a union obtains cards from a majority of the employees in the unit, it may seek recogni-
tion by making a demand therefore to the employer based on its majority card showing.
5 Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). This case reversed the doctrine
established in Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954), that a union which went
the election route to gain representative status and lost, could not later complain of
unfair labor practices and seek a refusal to bargain finding. Under Bernel Foam, the
union can agree to an election and, after losing, seek a bargaining order by filing refusal
to bargain charges. This so-called "second bite at the apple" for the union is somewhat
qualified by the ruling that a refusal to bargain finding will not issue after an election
defeat unless the election is set aside pursuant to valid objections. Irving Air Chute Co.,
149 N.L.R.B. 627, enfd, 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965); cf. Pure Chem. Corp., 192 N.L.R.B.
No. 88 (1971) (dissenting opinion of Member Kennedy). Since the crucial period for
objectionable conduct, dates from the filing of the election petition through to the date
of the election, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453 (1962), Ideal Elec. & Mfg.
Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1961), unfair labor practices committed prior to the filing of the
petition cannot form the basis of a subsequent bargaining order. Thus, a union faced
with employer violations prior to the filing of its petition runs the risk of losing them
as a basis for an 8(a)(5) charge upon filing for an election where the employer "reforms"
and engages in no objectionable conduct during the crucial period; the same is true where
the employer files the petition. In the instance of pre-petition violations, the union must,
in effect, still make an election of remedies.
6 See, e.g., Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 137 (1964) [hereinafter Bok].
7 Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961).
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to destroy a majority already believed attained. Indeed, the courts- had
found that employers who committed unfair labor practices neverthe-
less had genuine good faith doubts of a union's claimed majority and
in such cases they refused to find a lack of good faith doubt.8- Of course,
the bad faith ab initio formula left no room for weighing the degree of
the unfair labor practices committed. Though the Board subsequently
attempted to effect a different result where the unfair labor practices
were of a minor nature,9 the distinctions seemed to be based more on
the desired result than the logic of Joy Silk. For the extent of the em-
ployer's unfair conduct might well be more a matter of the employer's
individual style, energy and imagination than a state of mind concern-
ing the validity of the union's claimed majority.
Moreover, the Board's test of good faith demanded a ritualized
employer response that was more the product of sophisticated advice
than of candid expression. For the most part, it can be assumed that
non-union employers prefer to remain that way. When confronted by
a union demand for recognition based upon a claim of a majority of
cards, they are facing the culmination of a campaign that may have
lasted for considerable duration and may have been quite intense and
was, moreover, completely one-sided. The employer may agree that
indeed the union has a majority of cards, but for him the real doubt is
whether that majority will hold up in a secret ballot election after he
has had a chance to tell his side of the story? That feeling - described
above - is, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from the
"desire to gain time to dissipate the union's majority." Yet to say to the
union, "I have no doubt that you have a majority of the cards, but I
would like to have time for the employees to hear my side of the story,"
could well have resulted in an order to bargain. Thus, sophisticated
employers learned to respond in classic expression of disbelief of ma-
jority support and to insist on an election. As one commentator wrote
at the time,
[t]he need to resolve any latent inconsistency between the ac-
knowledgment of a privilege to rely on a generalized "distrust of
8 See, e.g., NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967). The Board itself
would find good faith doubt notwithstanding subsequent unfair labor practices where
the employer previously had experience with unions claiming a card majority only
subsequently to lose a fair election. See Shelby v. Williams of Tennessee, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B.
737 (1967).
9 See, e.g., Clermonts' Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1397, 1401 (1965).
Although, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, Respondent is nevertheless
responsible for the conduct of these minor supervisors, the inddents themselves
are hardly serious enough to support a finding that Respondent-had earlier refused
to bargain with the Union on request in order to gain time to- undermine the
Union by unlawful means.
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cards" and the denial of an opportunity to see if the employees
"might change their minds" has not yet been given recognition in
NLRB opinions. 10
Integral to the dissatisfaction with the test was the necessary reli-
ance on authorization cards as the alternative to an election in estab-
lishing majority status. The Board exercises careful and close regulation
of election campaign tactics and procedures. 1 For example, there are
rules guaranteeing equality of opportunity of expression to assure to the
employees the right to make an informed decision by hearing both
sides; 12 ballots are printed in the native language of the employee,
where necessary;' 3 and all parties involved -employees, employer and
union - share in the knowledge of the election date, allowing equal
opportunity for the employer and the union to shape their campaigns
accordingly. Essentially, the Board strives to maintain an election at-
mosphere conducive to the exercise of employee free choice.'14
In marked contrast, authorization cards are collected unilaterally
under circumstances virtually free from any regulation, short of prov-
able fraud. Cards can be gathered in bars, singly or in groups, without
solemnity or ceremony and over an extended period of time.15 The-
oretically, the so-called card majority can be the cumulative number of
individual cards collected over an extended period and thus never at
any single point in time represent the true wishes of the majority, for
the Board counts every validly solicited card that has not been specifi-
cally withdrawn prior to the demand.16 This has been the practice, even
where, in one recent case, the signer testified that she spoke about get-
ting her card back.'7
"OLesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65
Miec. L. REv. 851, 854 (1967) [hereinafter Lesnick].
11 See generally Bok, supra note 6, for an extended discussion of the Board's regula-
tion of election tactics.
12 See, e.g., Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), requiring manage-
ment to prepare a list of names and addresses of all the employees qualified to vote and
make them available to the union.
13 See NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 205 n.10 (2d Cir. 1967).
14 The Board's "laboratory conditions" standard for conducting fair elections was
enunciated in General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
15 Generally, a card must have been executed during the union's current organizing
campaign to be counted. Grand Union Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 589 (1958), enrd, 279 F.2d 83
(2d Cir. 1960). Cards signed at some time during a sustained nine-month organizational
effort have been upheld. NLRB v. Greenfield Components Corp., 317 F.2d 85 (1st Cir.
1963). Moreover, in an admittedly unusual case, even cards solicited more than two years
prior to the demand were upheld. Northern Trust Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 652 (1946).
16 See TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 1495 (1965).
17 NLRB v. Easton Packing Co., 437 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1971). It is questionable whether
any employee who signs a card upon the representation that it will be used in an election
is going to risk the organizer's ire and peer pressures to ask for it back rather than
wait for the election to vote against the union. In this connection, the Board recently
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In addition, the cards themselves can include declarations both of
securing an election and authorizing union representation, plainly
adding an element of doubt as to the intentions or understanding of the
signer. These so-called dual-purpose cards have been accepted by the
Board.'8 Indeed, where the card is single purpose - i.e., it only refers to
authorization - but the union solicitor talked about using it for an
election, the Board has ruled that the card will be set aside only upon
the finding that it was solicited with the express representation that it
was solely to be used for an election. 19 This rule seemed to call for an
unwarranted degree of discernment on the part of employees since it
seemed that
a sophisticated and only modestly talented union agent could
easily live with such a narrow rule and, leaving out the bad words
- "sole" and "only" - employ language clearly calculated to
lead a woman laundry worker to believe that the holding of an
election was all that she signed for.20
In the recent years prior to NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,21 the
basic insufficiency of the good faith doubt test drew increasing criticism
of the Board's handling of refusal to bargain cases. 2 The Board itself
began to justify using cards rather than a Board election where the
"employer has deprived his employees of an opportunity for a fair
election by an illegal campaign of interference, restraint and coercion
expressly calculated to frustrate their free choice. '23 The test was
has even held a card valid where the employee upon signing it stated that he would vote
against the union in the election. The Board held that such an uncontroverted indication
of the signer's misunderstanding of the effect of the card did not negate the clear language
of the cardl Essex Wire Corp., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 59 (Feb. 2, 1971).
18 See, e.g., Brandenburg Tel. Co., 164 N.LR.B. 825 (1967); Lenz Co., 153 N.L.R.B.
1599 (1965). But see note 72 and accompanying text infra for a more recent Board view.
19 Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), end, 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965).
20 Bryant Chucking Grinder Co., 389 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.,
concurring) enf'g 160 N.L.R.B. 1526 (1966) and quoting NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners,
Inc., 384 F.2d 609, 620 (6th Cir. 1967).
21 395 U.S. 575, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
2 2 In addition to criticism of the good faith doubt test, coming both from the courts,
see NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1968), and legal commentators, e.g.,
Lesnick, supra note 10, there was a disparity of judicial opinion as to the validity of the
Board's Cumberland rule. The Second, Fourth and Fifth Circuits rejected it. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co., 380
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967); Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1967).
The First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits adopted the rule for the
most part, but not without criticizing the Board's tendency to apply it too mechanically and,
in some cases, even refusing to enforce the Board's application of the rule. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968), denying enforcement in part 158
N.L.R.B. 805 (1966); NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, 384 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1967), denying
enforcement in part 152 N.L.R.B. 163 (1965); Furrs, Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 562 (10th Cir.
1967); NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 380 F.2d 851 (1st Cir. 1967).
23 Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 805, 807 n.5 (1966), enf'd in part, 390 F.2d 304
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further diluted by the Board ruling in John P. Serpa, Inc.,24 that hence-
forth the General Counsel had the burden of affirmatively showing bad
faith. Thus, an employer no longer had to state or show any grounds
for doubt when asked for recognition. He could merely state his prefer-
ence for an election, and, absent unfair labor practices or circumstances
showing independent knowledge of a majority, there would be no
finding of bad faith.
The Board was, therefore, already in the process of discarding the
Joy Silk test of good faith doubt before its oral argument in Gissel. It
had not yet admitted it, but was to have that opportunity when the
Fourth Circuit, in a series of cases capping their dissatisfaction with
cards, ruled that no bad faith could be found in a refusal to recognize
based upon a claim of cards since cards were per se unreliable and there-
fore grounds for doubt.2 5
NLRB v. GISSEL PACKING Co.: A NEw TEST
FOR BARGAINING ORDERS
In Gissel, the Court passed upon essentially similar situations
brought before it in four separate cases. Three of the cases were con-
solidated following separate per curiam decisions in the Fourth Cir-
cuit;28 the fourth case emanated from the First Circuit 27 In each of the
cases, the employers had refused to recognize unions whose demands
were based upon-a majority of single-purpose authorization cards and
had engaged in vigorous anti-union campaigns characterized by nu-
merous unfair labor practices. In each of the cases the Board had issued
bargaining orders to remedy the employer's refusals to bargain, which
were found to be violative of section 8(a)(5) inasmuch as they had mani-
fested desires to dissipate the unions' majority status and thus demon-
strated an absence of a good faith doubt as to that status.28 The Fourth
Circuit upheld the Board's independent unfair labor practice findings
but refused to find any refusals to bargain. Concerning these, the
circuit court's position was that
(7th Cir. 1968). Significantly, in River Togs, the Second Circuit justified its enforcement of
a refusal to bargain finding in Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1966), on the
grounds that the employer had made a free election impossible.
24 155 N.L.R.B. 99 (1965), order set aside sub nom., Retail Clerks Local 1179 v. NLRB,
376 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1967); accord, Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
25 General Steel Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's,
Inc., 898 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 898 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.
1968).
268 Id.
27 NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). Sinclair also presented a first
amendment question not pertinent to, the present discussion.
28 395 U.S. at 580-89.
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cards themselves were so inherently unreliable that their use gave
an employer virtually an automatic, good faith claim that ... a
[representation] dispute existed, for which a secret election was
necessary.29
In the fourth case, the First Circuit enforced the Board's bargaining
order, specifically rejecting the position of the Fourth Circuit.
At the oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Board aban-
doned its good faith rhetoric and asserted a look-at-what-we-do - not-
what-we-say rule that elaborated on its Aaron Brothers Co.30 rationale
and now clearly asserted that what the Board had really been doing was
weighing the effects of the employer's unfair labor practices on the
election process. In this view
an employer's good faith doubt is largely irrelevant, and the key
to the issuance of a bargaining order is the commission of serious
unfair labor practices that interfere with the election processes and
tend to preclude the holding of a fair election.81
In adopting the Board's newly stated view, the Supreme Court
first laid to rest the long-running controversy over the statutory basis
for ordering bargaining without an election. It held that the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA clearly allowed
for bargaining orders based upon majority status established by means
other than an election. 2
Next, the Court turned to the use of cards as an alternative to the
election. Here the Court affirmed the superiority of the election pro-
cedure as the means of ascertaining employee choice but approved the
Board's Cumberland rule on single-purpose cards, stating that
employees should be bound by the clear language of what they
sign unless that language is deliberately and dearly canceled by a
union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to dis-
regard and forget the language above his signature.83
29 Id. at 585-86.
30158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966). Aaron Bros. is generally considered as having codified the
modifications to the original Joy Silk test, including the previously mentioned shift in
Board position announced in Serpa, requiring an affirmative showing of employer bad
faith before a card-based bargaining order could issue.
313 95 US. at 594. The Court noted that "largely irrelevant" referred to the cases
where an employer committed no independent violations but clearly had no doubt of the
union's card majority and a bargaining order issued despite the high probability of a
fair election. The Court specifically noted that it was not passing upon the validity of
these cases since the issue was not involved in any of the cases before the Court. Id. at 601
n.18.
32 Id. at 595-600.
33 Id. at 606.
While there is little to argue with in that statement, it does not necessarily support
the law of Cumberland that only the words "only" or "solely" dearly cancel the plain
1971]
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The Court specifically rejected any subjective inquiry into the em-
ployee's motivation as "unreliable." Ostensibly, the determination was
to be made from the totality of objective circumstances.3 4
The Court then turned to the final issue, namely whether a card-
based bargaining order is the appropriate remedy for a section 8(a)(5)
violation where an employer commits independent unfair labor prac-
tices that tend to dissipate the union's card majority and to preclude
the holding of a fair election. Considering the Board's practice, the
Court distinguished three types of situations where a refusal to recog-
nize was accompanied by independent unfair labor practices. In the
first group of "exceptional" cases characterized by "outrageous" and
"pervasive" unfair labor practices, the Court approved of the Board's
"policy of issuing a bargaining order, in the absence of a section 8(a)(5)
violation or even a bargaining demand, when that was the only avail-
able, effective remedy for substantial unfair labor practices."3 5 In then
considering what has become known as "category two" violations, the
Court noted that its holding in Gissel merely approved "the Board's use
of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases marked by less per-
vasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine
majority strength and impede the election processes," provided there is
a showing that the union had achieved majority status at one point.36
In this event, the Court set forth the criteria for the Board to use in
determining whether to issue a bargaining order, stating that
the Board can properly take into consideration the extensiveness
of an employer's unfair practices in terms of their past effect on
election conditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the
future. If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects
of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun)
by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and
that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on
balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an
order should issue.37
In addition, the Court noted that there was "a third category of minor
or less extensive unfair labor practices, which, because of their minimal
language of the card. Obviously such a rule would be far too restrictive an application of
that statement. The Court seemed to recognize this, for immediately upon stating its
support for Cumberland, it cited the Board's decision in Levi Strauss Co., 172 N.L.R.B.
No. 57 (June 28, 1968) to caution that Cumberland should not be applied mechanically, but
that reliance should be on substance not form and the impression given from the "totality
of circumstances." 595 U.S. at 607-08.
34 395 US. at 607-08.
35 Id. at 614.
86 Id.
371d. at 614-15.
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impact on the election machinery, will not sustain a bargaining
order."38
Applying these criteria to the specific cases before it, the Court
affirmed the First Circuit's enforcement of the Board's bargaining
order. Although the Board had found a section 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain
violation, it also found that the employer's section 8(a)(1) violations
(consisting of threats of reprisal) were so coercive as to warrant a bar-
gaining order absent an 8(a)(5) violation. Thus it was placed in the
first category of "exceptional" cases where the Court sanctioned the
Board's practice of issuing orders absent even a union demand to bar-
gain on the basis of a majority showing. With respect to the Fourth
Circuit cases, the Court noted that there was no indication by the
Board that it had analyzed the section 8(a)(1) and (3) violations under
the new test requiring an evaluation of their effect on the election
process and therefore, remanded them to the Board for proper findings
in accordance with the new standards.
THE PosT-GISSEL EXPERIENCE
If the Court in Gissel seemed to have helped the Board rid itself
of its rhetorical burden of good faith and its concomitant arcane divina-
tion of the employer's mind by placing the bargaining remedy on the
scales of reliability to be measured against the election process, the
Board seemed not to have noticed. Prior to Gissel, the Board's decisions
would recite the unfair labor practices found and then state in con-
clusory fashion that such did or did not indicate bad faith and that
a bargaining order should or should not issue. There was no analysis
to bridge the facts to the conclusion. After Gissel, the Board recited
the unfair labor practices found and then stated that such tended "to
destroy the employees' free choice by frightening them into with-
drawing their allegience (sic) from the Union and were of such a
nature as to have a lingering effect and make a fair or coercion-free
election quite dubious, if not impossible." 39 There was no analysis to
bridge the facts to the conclusion.
Thus, in some seventy Board opinions immediately following
Gissel there were only seven cases in which the Board was somehow,
for some unspecified reason, able to conclude that the preferred election
procedure could be effectively utilized.40 Four of the seven involved
38 Id. at 615.
29 General Stencils, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 108, 109 (1969), enf'd in part, 438 F.2d 894 (2d
Cir. 1971).
40 Bill Pierre Ford, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 155 (Aug. 3, 1970); J. A. Conley Co., 181
N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Feb. 12, 1970); Blade-Tribune Publishing Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (Dec.
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8(a)(1) violations so minor as to approach de minimis.41 Two cases
involved violations of an aggravated nature,42 and the seventh case,
though roughly comparable, involved what could be termed serious
violations.43 There is no attempt to rationalize the apparent incon-
sistencies in its holdings. There is no explanation of why the Blade
Tribune Publishing Co. employees, who had been subjected to illegal
interrogation and promises of benefits and an instance of a discrimina-
tory job assignment, were nonetheless ready for a fair election, while
the General Stencils, Inc. employees, a limited number of whom had
endured interrogation and threats of loss of benefits, could no longer
express themselves freely.
Nowhere in these cases does the Board disclose, much less analyze,
the particular factual basis for its finding that a fair election cannot be
conducted. It does not begin to manifest a careful weighing of the
alternative probabilities in the circumstances of the case. The em-
ployer's violations are nowhere discussed in terms of their "past effect"
or "likelihood of recurrence. ' 44 No analysis is presented as to which,
if any, of the employer's unfair labor practices would be likely to have
a "lingering effect."45 No discussion is devoted to the importance (or
lack of importance) of the existing employer-employee relationship, to
the average tenure of the employees, to the activities of the union. No
consideration is revealed concerning possible alternative remedies -
either traditional or extraordinary.46
16, 1969); Arcoa Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (Dec. 12, 1969); Schrementi Bros., 179 N.L.R.B.
853 (1969); Seymour Transfer, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 26 (1969); Stoutco, Inc., 180 NJ.LRB.
No. 11 (Dec. 15, 1969).
41 Seymour Transfer Inc. (isolated single interrogation concerning information that
the employee had previously volunteered he had); Arcoa Corp. (technical violation of
Board's Struksnes polling rule-a "borderline" violation); J. A. Conley Co. (employer,
who subsequently became vocal pro-union activist, spoke against union with employer
encouragement, conveying "Respondent's keen displeasure about their union affiliation,"
and Board found that no threats, acts or incidents of coercion, interrogation, or discharges
were undertaken by the employer); Bill Pierre Ford, Inc. (Board found violation so minor
that it declined even to issue a cease and desist order).
42 Blade-Tribune Publishing Co. (activities included interrogation of 13 of the 22
unit employees by the editor in his office, section 8(a)(3) discrimination against active
union adherent designed to cause him to quit, promise and award of benefits, etc.);
Schrementi Bros. (including physical assaults against non-employee union organizer in
view of employees, interrogation).
43 Stoutco, Inc. (concerned repeated threats of retaliation by foreman, "suggestion" by
company president that union activist quit, and prediction that he would be gone after
election).
44 Has the employer a past history of similar violations? Have there been elections in
the past unaccompanied by any violations? Is the violation likely to be repeated; e.g., is it
an ad hoc response to a unique situation or is it a premeditated attempt to coerce?
45 An act that the employees will remember, e.g., a discharge or a wage increase.
46 See Loray Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 57, (July 20, 1970) where in the face of "out-
rageous and pervasive" violations of section 8(a)(1) and (3), the Board nevertheless declined
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The Board seemed to be doing exactly what it had once chastized
a trial examiner for doing, i.e., making "mere broad conclusions . ..
without setting forth the relevant evidence supporting these conclu-
sions and without an analysis of the evidence . . . to show how he
arrived at his conclusions." 47 Significantly, the Board's decisions in
these cases appear to violate the mandate of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act that it state "its findings and conclusions, and the reasons
or basis therefor on all the material issues of fact or law presented on
the record."48 The failure to articulate its grounds for decisions in these
cases has resulted in apparently inconsistent determinations. Further,
it leaves the reviewing courts with no basis for review since there is no
indication of the Board's bases for decision. 49
Moreover, Gissel requires that the Board carefully weigh the
alternative prior to issuing a bargaining order - a remedy which aborts
the normal course of a secret ballot election and which, for all practical
purposes, locks both the employer and the individual employees into
the mandatory, exclusive and institutionalized machinery of collective
representation for at least one year. Where the employer's actions are
sufficiently serious to permanently taint the election and deprive it
of its normal protections and reliability, the Board, lacking a better
alternative, is authorized to invest the union-solicited cards with the
to issue a bargaining order in the absence of proof of a majority. The Board, while not
disowning the authority to issue such an order, concluded,
we have devised special remedies for the aggravated and pervasive 8(a)(1) and
(3) violations which in our opinion will enable employees freely to exercise their
Section 7 rights to choose whether or not they wish to be represented by the
Union.
Id. at 3. The Board ordered the following remedies: (a) Company's owner, president and
chief perpetrator to sign the required notice. (b) Company to mail copies to each em-
ployee's home in addition to the required posting. (c) Company to afford union three
months' access to the company's bulletin boards. (d) Company to arrange for a one hour,
paid meeting on the company premises at which the union can address its employees.
(e) In the event of future employer speeches on the subject of the union, the company is
to provide equal paid time at a mutually agreeable hour for the union to address the
employees. (I) Company to supply union with names and addresses of current employees
should the union so request within a year's time. (g) Board announced that it will waive
thirty percent requirement for election petitions should the union file a petition within
thirty days of the company's compliance with the above.
See also NLRB v. Elson Bottling Co., 379 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1967).
47 Funkhauser Mills, 132 N.L.R.B. 245, 247 (1961). But cf. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc.,
152 N.L.R.B. 163 (1965).
485 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) (1970).
49 See NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965), where the Supreme
Court in reviewing Board unit determinations complained that
[d]ue to the Board's lack of articulated reasons for the decisions in and distinc-
tions among these cases, the Board's action here cannot be properly reviewed.
When the Board so exercises the discretion given to it by Congress, it must "dis-
dose the basis of its order" and "give clear indication that it has exercised the dis-
cretion with which Congress has empowered it."
Id. at 442-43.
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respectability and efficacy of an election. Where, however, other Board
remedies can, with reasonable probability, reestablish the election
machinery's reliability, the Board is precluded from issuing a bargain-
ing order. For, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Gissel,
[t]he Board itself has recognized and continues to do so here,
that secret elections are generally the most satisfactory - indeed
the preferred -method of ascertaining whether a union has
majority support.50
This process of weighing the alternatives would of necessity in-
volve the Board in rationalizing and reconciling its determinations.
In short, it would really be exercising the expertise with which it has
been credited5 rather than asserting it in defense of its unexplained
conclusions.
The Board's failure to rationalize its application of Gissel standards
to the facts in each case has led to a wide disparity in the treatment of
its bargaining orders by reviewing courts. Thus, the Fifth Circuit
rejected a Board decision where the Board had merely reworded a
pre-Gissel decision to conform to the new language, branding it no
more than a "litany reciting conclusions by rote without factual explica-
tion."52
The Second Circuit in General Stencils pointed out that the Board's
failure precisely to analyze the impact of each of the unfair labor
practices in terms of their impact on an election left the court with no
guide as to the Board's views on the possibility of a fair election should
the court vacate, as it did in that case, one or more of the section 8(a)(1)
findings. The court also pointed out that it was troubled by the incon-
sistency of the Board in three other cases where the Board had declined
to issue a bargaining order despite unfair labor practices that appeared
to involve far graver consequences for a subsequent election than those
in the immediate case.53
Of interest is that the court itself made some of the analysis Gissel
assigns to the Board. The court noted that employer threats to eliminate
benefits were cited by the Supreme Court in Gissel as having statis-
tically less effect on rerun elections than threats of plant closures. The
50 395 U.S. at 602.
51 See id. at 612 n.32.
52 NLRB v. American Cable Systems, 427 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1970).
53 438 F.2d at 903-04, citing Stoutco, Schrementi, and Blade-Tribune. The latter was
particularly ironic because the Board reversed the trial examiner's pre-Gissel finding that
the employer was guilty of a refusal to bargain, and, in General Stencils, the Board
reversed the same trial examiner's pre-Gissel findings that the employer was not guilty of
such violation (emphasis added).
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court doubted, therefore, that the employer's threats in General Sten-
cils to eliminate free doughnuts and to enforce a no-smoking rule
could be the basis for a bargaining order. On the other hand, the
court accepted the fact that a threat of plant closure was sufficiently
severe to preclude a fair election. However, the court found no evidence
that such a threat had traveled further than one employee, and under
such circumstances, the threat would not preclude a fair election. 4
The court, per Judge Friendly, also stated its prescription for
some degree of consistency in future cases in the area.
Despite the Board's aversion to utilizing its rule-making powers
and the conceded impracticability of framing a rule that would
cover every possible variation of employer misconduct, this is a
situation where Professor Davis' proposal of a rule "limited to
resolving one or more hypothetical cases, without generalizing,"
would reveal at least some of the Board's thought processes to
unions, employers, and reviewing courts, and would bring about
a degree of certainty and uniformity that, as will appear below,
does not seem to have been attained. Failing that, there could be
an opinion by the full Board illuminating how it meant to apply
its Gissel-given authority -a course particularly important for
an agency that is forced by the press of business so often to
delegate its authority to three-member panelst55] .... Failing that,
the Board should explain in each case just what it considers to
have precluded a fair election and why, and in what respects the
case differs from others where it has reached an opposite con-
clusion. Detailed explication of this sort is peculiarly necessary
because of the possibility, which has here become an actuality,
that a reviewing court will vacate one of the § 8(a)(1) findings on
the "totality" of which the Board relied to justify a bargaining
order, and the consequent possible need for a remand unless the
court can be satisfied that the error did not affect the command
to bargain.50
In General Steele Products Inc. v. NLRB,57 one of the original
54 Id. at 902 n.11.
55 Although the Board consists of five members, it is authorized to delegate its powers
to three members and usually does so. 29 U.S.C. §37(a) & (b) (1964). Indeed, Judge
Friendly's suggestion in this regard is supported by the actual occurrences in the cases
just considered inasmuch as each was decided by a different three member panel; e.g.,
General Stencils (McCulloch, Fanning, Brown); Schrementi (McCulloch, Fanning, Jenkins);
and Blade-Tribune (McCulloch, Brown, Zagoria). In fact, a case may be heard by any one
of the six possible three-member panels.
56 438 F.2d at 901-02 (footnotes omitted).
57- F.2d - (4th Cir. 1971). The court was careful to distinguish the immediate
case, where the changed facts had occurred before the initial Board hearing, from the
situation where the changed facts occur after a Board order and prior to enforcement. In
this regard, the court cited with favor the Fifth Circuit's decision in American Cable, that
Gissel required that the Board take into consideration the current circumstances before
issuing a bargaining order. The Second Circuit indicated some approval of this approach
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cases of the Gissel quartet, the Fourth Circuit found that the Board,
on remand from the Supreme Court, had merely reworded its original
decision in Gissel language. The Board had refused to reopen the
record to consider the fact that prior to the initial hearing before a trial
examiner the ownership of the employer had changed. The court noted
that the evidence was not introduced originally since it was not relevant
under the good faith doubt test. Here again, the Board ignored the
basic test of the Gissel doctrine, for the fact that the employer who had
committed the unfair labor practices is no longer on the scene is cer-
tainly relevant to a determination concerning any "lingering effect"
of the violation and the "likelihood that such would recur." Apparently
in agreement, the Court remanded the case to allow for the considera-
tion of such evidence.
The Seventh Circuit has also recognized the Board's failure to
"show by analysis of the factual situation 'that the possibilities of eras-
ing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election [or a
fair rerun] by the use of traditional remedies though present, is
slight.' ,s In one recent case, it vacated a bargaining order and re-
manded for the necessary Board findings.5 9 In three others, however,
the Court made the analysis itself rather than prolonging the already
lengthy time span in resolving the dispute.60 In each case they found
justification for a bargaining order.
The Eighth Circuit, after reviewing a number of cases, announced
in General Stencils. 438 F.2d at 905. The Board itself rejects this formulation, reasoning
that these cases justify no exception from the settled rule that the loss of majority or
other events occurring after the commission of unfair labor practices should not be
considered in fashioning a remedy since to do otherwise would allow the employer to
profit from his wrongdoing. The Board's reasoning appears persuasive, but only in situa-
tions where the change in circumstances or the delay is due to the employer's acts. For
example, in situations where the employer has changed, the employer is not profiting by
his misdeeds and the employees might well feel free enough under the new management
to vote freely. In such circumstances, viewing the election possibility at the time of the
order would seem proper.
58 New Alaska Development Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1971).
59 Id.
60 In NLRB v. Henry Colder Co., 447 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1971), the court singled out a
discriminatory discharge, threats of blacklisting, and promises of benefits as likely to linger
long in the employee's memory. In NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1971), the
court held that (1) promises of benefit would be viewed in their historical context and
would be considered relatively unimportant; and (2) a Board order for disestablishment of
an illegally assisted advisory board would erase its effect on a fair rerun; but (3) the vague
preelection threats of discharge made real by post election discharges were serious enough
to necessitate a bargaining order. In NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1971),
the court found that the employer's threats and interrogation of three out of five em-
ployees together with the subsequent discriminatory discharge of two, when viewed in the
context of the small city location, made it unlikely that the present employees and even
potential future employees would be able to vote freely.
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guidelines of its own in evaluating whether independent unfair labor
practices would warrant a bargaining order. They are as follows:
1) Where the underlying facts affirmatively show that the
unfair labor practices have in fact undermined a union majority,
typically evidenced by the union losing an election or the em-
ployees seeking to withdraw from the union following the oc-
currence of the conduct in question, we grant enforcement.
2) Where the record is silent concerning the actual impact
of the employer's unfair labor practices, we defer to the Board's
exercise of discretion and grant enforcement; and
3) Where the evidence establishes that the unfair labor
practices produced little or no impact upon the employees'
allegiance to the union, we deny enforcement.6 '
The court applied these guidelines to deny a bargaining order despite a
discriminatory discharge. It found that since the union obtained eleven
of its fourteen cards after the discharge (and other unfair labor prac-
tices), the violations did not in fact undermine the union's majority
and an election could be held. The problems with the guidelines are
manifest. Under its rules, the Eighth Circuit precludes the possibility
of having a rerun election since in the context of any employer inter-
ference a rerun implies an initial election lost by the union and hence
a clear indication that the majority was undermined. The court, how-
ever, is misreading Gissel when it makes the undermining of the major-
ity determinative of the issue of whether a free election can subse-
quently be held. Obviously, the fact that a majority of employees signed
cards after a discharge is an indication that the employees, or a great
majority of them, still felt free to exercise their choice. However, the
converse does not necessarily follow, i.e., that after losing an election
and the imposition of traditional Board remedies, a fair rerun election
cannot be held.
The Eighth Circuit's initiative, as with that of the Second, Fourth,
Fifth and Seventh, is understandable, if unfortunate, in light of the
Board's abdication of its responsibility to make the necessary analysis
and develop a coherent approach to these cases.
APPLYING THE TFACHING OF GISSEL: IMPROVING THE
RELIABILITY OF AUTHORIZATION CARDS
Basic to the Board's position before the Supreme Court in Gissel
was the contention that its reliance on authorization cards in the event
of employer unfair labor practices was justified where, in view of the
61 Arbie Mineral Feed Co. v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1971); see Dawson Metal
Prods. Inc. v. NLRB, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1971).
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tainted atmosphere, the cards were the more reliable indicator of
employee sentiment. The Court found, as noted earlier, that the
Board had statutory authority for using cards to support a bargaining
order and it approved its Cumberland rules on solicitation.62 However,
the fact that the Supreme Court upheld the Board's card practices as
a matter of law is no justification for continuing the practice as a matter
of policy. The Board, having justified the use of cards on the basis
of comparative reliability has an obligation to ensure that they are as
accurate an indication of employee sentiment as possible.63
Unfortunately, the Board in its post-Gissel cases manifests little
inclination to do so. Thus, in Essex Wire Corp.,64 the Board counted
the cards of (1) an employee who was told that the reason for the card
was "just to bring in a vote," (2) an employee who was told that the
only purpose of the card was for an election, (3) an employee who
questioned the card's use and was told that it was so he could vote in
the election for the union, (4) an employee who was told that the
card's purpose was "to bring it to an election" as had been the case in
previous years, (5) an employee who had signed the card saying he
would not vote for the union, (6) an employee who stated that she
did not want to sign because she was not sure she would vote for the
union only to be told that she should sign since it was not for the union
but to get an election, and (7) a woman who was visited at her home
and told that the card was to show that the solicitor had been there
so that no one else would come and see her.65
It would seem grossly mechanistic to hold that these employees
intended to authorize the union to represent them by signing the
cards. Ironically, it would seem that these problems can be easily solved.
For it seems a relatively simple matter for the Board to prescribe in
precise form what an authorization card should say if it is to be used
as proof of majority status. This could be accomplished either by exer-
cise of the Board's rule-making powers or, as it has seen fit to do on
62 See notes 33-34 and- accompanying text supra.
63 Indeed, if the employer has made a free election impossible, but the cards are
rejected because of ambiguity or misrepresentation, the employees might well be deprived
of any means of effectively exercising their choice.
64 188 N.LR.B. No. 59 (Feb. 2, 1971).
65 It should be noted that the Board did reject seven other cards on the basis of
misrepresentation, but found a majority of 182 out of 345 employees. It would appear that,
as Chairman Miller pointed out in his dissent, in circumstances where there are clear
misrepresentations made in the solicitations in a number of instances and less clear indi-
cations of misrepresentation in others, it is likely that there are other cards which were
obtained in the same manner, and the Board should therefore view the reliability of all
the cards in that light. Moreover, in view of the standard Board presumption that em-
ployees will carry employer threats to others, it is no less probable that they would carry
union misrepresentations.
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other occasions, in the context of a comprehensive Board decision on
the issue.
The Board has been repeatedly criticized by commentators for
its refusal to exercise its rule-making powers. 68 The exhausting card-
by-card litigation made necessary by the present ad hoc determinations
prompted Judge Friendly to remark that
[w]hat would truly ease the administrative problem both for the
Board and for the courts would be for the Board to use its long
neglected rule-making power and specify what a union authori-
zation card should say and how.67
Alternatively, should the Board continue in its reluctance to issue
rules as such, it could detail its specifications in the context of a
decision, as it has done, for example, in prescribing acceptable union-
security clauses68 and union hiring halls. 9
Indeed, there seems to be no reason why the Board should not
declare that henceforth it will use as evidence of a majority only cards
that (1) state clearly the employee's authorization of the union to "act
as my collective bargaining agent with the company for wages, hours
and working conditions,"70 and (2) which further state in bold letters
the following:
CAUTION: THIS CARD MAY BE USED TO SECURE BAR-
GAINING RIGHTS WITHOUT AN ELEC-
TION
It would seem that there should be little objection to the Board's
prescription of such a card. There is virtually no valid interest in pre-
serving the present variations in the language of the card and much to
be said for uniformity. Variations can only serve to mislead and confuse
66 See, e.g., Davis, Failure of Agencies to Make Substantive Rules That Ought to be
Made, I K. DAvis, ADAIN. LAW TREATISE § 6.13 (1965). Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making
Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Peck, Critique of
the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formation: Adjudication and
Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1968).
67 Bryant Chucking Grinder Company v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 565, 570 (2d Cir. 1967)
(footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 392 US. 908 (1968).
68 Keystone Coat and Apron Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 880, 885 (1958).
(9 Mountain-Pacific, 119 N.L.R.B.. 883 (1957).
7o This was the language of the card approved by the Board in John S. Barnes Co.,
180 N.L.R.B. No. 189 (Jan. 23, 1970). See also Snyder Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 1348
(2d Cir. 1970). The Board should give serious consideration to requiring authorization cards
to be notarized. This would lend some dignity and solemnity to the occasion and impart to
the employees a sense of the significance of the act of signing a card. While the rule would
probably spawn a huge number of organizer-notaries, the effects could only serve to make
cards a more reliable measure of intent and reduce, at least to some extent, the marked
difference in circumstances surrounding voting in a secret ballot election.
1971]
ST, JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the signer, whereas uniformity would tend to create a general under-
standing by employees of what authorization cards are all about.
Further, the caveat on the card in boldface would help lay to rest the
confusion surrounding these cards as to whether the cards were signed
for reasons other than to signify support for the union. A literate
employee could not complain of assuming that the card would only
be used for an election in the face of the clear warning on the card's
face.71
Possible union objections to such a warning on the card as inhibit-
ing the securing of such authorizations must be rejected, for the warning
would only be stating precisely the card's purpose and possible effect.
Obviously, the same cards could be used to satisfy the Board's thirty
percent showing of interest requirement in support of a union petition
for an election. On the other hand, if the union resolved only to seek
an election and felt that it would be easier to solicit cards limited to
that purpose, it could employ a different card. Naturally, this second
type card could not be used for purposes of proving majority status.
The Board has already elaborated on Gissel by invalidating dual-
purpose authorization cards, at least in one case.72 In Gissel, the Court
held that a signer should be bound by the clear language of what he
signs. If employees of varying sophistication are to be held to statements
on cards to which they subscribe, the language ought to be made as plain
and clear an expression of that intent as it may ultimately be held
to manifest.
APPLYING THE TEACHING OF GISSEL:
THE IssuE THE COURT LEFT OPEN
Perhaps nowhere is the Board's failure to absorb the full implica-
tions of the Gissel rationale clearer than in its treatment of cases where
the employer has committed no unfair labor practices.
The Court in Gissel expressly left open the issue as to whether an
employer can insist on an election as long as he has committed no
unfair labor practices. 73 The Court noted that it was not passing on
whether a bargaining order was ever appropriate where there were no
unfair labor practices. Thus, the Court ostensibly took no position on
the Board's Snow & Sons, Inc. line of cases. The Board, however,
71 Naturally, an employee who cannot read should not be held to his card unless its
meaning was clearly explained. Gate of Spain Restaurant, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (-).
72 John S. Barnes Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 139, (Jan. 23, 1970). Inasmuch as each of the
cases before the Gissel Court involved single-purpose cards, the Court made no decision
concerning dual-purpose cards. See 395 US. at 583 n.4, 601 n.18 & 606.
73 395 U.S. at 601 n.18.
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should have had little difficulty in applying the Gissel principles to
this area. As has been shown, the Board had already narrowed the
application of Snow & Sons by its requirement of affirmative evidence
of bad faith.74 Thus, an employer, even before Gissel, could remain
silent in the face of a bargaining demand, and so long as he committed
no unfair labor practices, the issue would be decided by an election.
Applying the focus of Gissel- examining the possibility of a
free election rather than the employer's motivations- would seem to
provide an easy answer. If the prospects for a free election are good,
then the employer's doubts about the union's majority are immaterial.
His state of mind should not serve to deprive the employees of their
right to decide. Indeed, if the test in the event of employer unfair labor
practices is to weigh whether an election or cards are a more reliable
means of ascertaining the employees' choice, a fortiori an election would
seem more desirable where there are no unfair labor practices and thus
no question as to its reliability.
Surprisingly enough, this area has proven a great source of diffi-
culty for the Board. In an early post-Gissel caser5 where an employer,
after carefully checking each card comprising a majority, had then
filed a petition for an election, the Board held that a refusal to bargain
did not lie since the employer had no knowledge outside of the cards
that the union had a majority. Though the result is consistent with
the Gissel rationale, it was thus reached by viewing the case through the
old Joy Silk focus on the employer's state of mind. This same result
should have been reached by holding that since an election was com-
pletely feasible, the employees should have the chance to decide. The
failure to apply Gissel's meaning to that situation led to unfortunate
results in subsequent cases where there were again no employer unfair
labor practices, but in addition to a majority of cards, the employees
struck.76 The Board based its decisions on its previous cases and the
unfortunate language of the Supreme Court in Gissel to the effect that
a union could establish its majority status by convincing support for
a strike vote or strike. This language appeared in the Court's discussion
of precedent holding that an election was not the only means allowed
for establishing a majority. It was cited to rebut the argument that
Congress intended bargaining rights to be established solely by an
74 John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 N.LR.B. 99 (1965), order set aside sub nom., Retail Clerks
Local 1199 v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1967); accord, Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B.
1077 (1966).
75 Bill Pierre Ford, 181 N.L.R.B. No. 155 (Aug. 3, 1970).
76 Wilder Mfg. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Aug. 27, 1970). Pacific Abrasive Supply Co.,
182 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (May 6, 1970).
1971]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
election. It was not cited, any more than were cards, as an equally sound
route to the establishment of a majority. Even assuming, arguendo,
that participation in a strike can signify union support as a matter of
sound inference, it is hardly consonant with the purposes of the NLRA
to encourage the resolution of questions of representation by strikes . 7
Moreover, it is totally at odds with the broad thrust of Gissel that,
absent unfair labor practices, an election is the superior way of ascer-
taining employee choice.
The Board in Wilder Manufacturing Co. recognized that its result
ran counter to the policy favoring elections and gratuitously added that
it would not have ordered bargaining if the employer had "indicated
willingness" to utilize the election procedure. There appeared to be no
lack of willingness other than the employer's failure to petition for
an election. Of course, completely overlooked in the Board's assessment,
is the union, which, without any taint on the "laboratory conditions"
opted for a strike rather than an election. A policy of encouraging
resort to an election is not advanced by punishing the employer who
remains silent and rewarding the union that strikes38
The Board- or at least a bare majority of the Board- seems
to realize that this concentration on the employer's state of mind was
leading back to the "good faith thicket of Joy Silk."7 9 In Summer & Co.
(voting three to two), it refused to find an 8(a)(5) violation even though
the union had achieved a card majority, a majority of the employees
had later struck, and the employer had shown not only an unwillingness
to consent to an election, but had also announced its determination
77 It hardly needs saying that an employee's joining a strike can be as much the
result of social coercion-labeled "scab"- or fear of bucking the picket line, as of
support for the union. Indeed, it's hard to square the Board's use of mere participation
in a strike as proof of union support with its holding that mere failure to participate in a
strike does not evidence rejection of union representation. Dayton Motels, Inc., 192
N.L.R.B. No. 112 (-); see also Norlee Togs, 129 N.L.R.B. 14 (1960). A recent Board
case seems to support this view, holding that failure to report to work after the estab-
lishment of the picket line, did not necessarily manifest support for the union's demand
for recognition. Abraham & Sons, 193 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (-). See also Electric Wiring, Inc.,
193 N.L.R.B. No. 166 ( ).
78 See World Carpets of New York, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 10 (Jan. 26, 1971) where
the Board found a section 8(a)(5) violation where the union had demanded recognition
and had then immediately engaged in picketing with a majority of the employees. The
picketing was marked at the outset by violence. The employer's independent unfair labor
practices occurred weeks after their picketing and acts of violence. Gissel would seem to
indicate that a bargaining order should not lie where the union by its acts has precluded
the possibility of a fair election. The Board, however, employing some novel standard
of comparative culpability, found that the union's misconduct was "less grave" and the
employer's was such that a fair election could not be held. It ignored completely the
fact that the union's misconduct was almost simultaneous with its demand while the
employer's occurred weeks later.
79 Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (June 7, 1971).
[Vol. 46:193
NLRB BARGAINING ORDERS
to litigate the union's showing of interest despite the election result
and had further announced that it would not bargain with the union.
However, the employer had committed no unfair labor practices. Recog-
nizing that this squarely presented the issue left unresolved by the
Supreme Court in Gissel, the Board held that:
The facts of the present case have caused us to reassess the wisdom
of attempting to divine, in retrospect, the state of employer (a)
knowledge and (b) intent at the time he refuses to accede to a
union demand for recognition. Unless, as in Snow & Sons, the
employer has agreed to let its "knowledge" of majority status be
established through a means other than a Board election, how
are we to evaluate whether it "knows" or whether it "doubts"
majority status? And if we are to let our decisions turn on an
employer's "willingness" to have majority status determined by
an election, how are we to judge "willingness" if the record is
silent, as in Wilder, or doubtful, as here, as to just how "willing"
the Respondent is in fact? We decline, in summary, to reenter
the "good-faith" thicket of Joy Silk, which we announced to the
Supreme Court in Gissel we had "virtually abandoned . . .
altogether ......
These considerations lead us to the conclusion that Respondent
should not be found guilty of a violation of Section 8(a)(5) solely
upon the basis of its refusal to accept evidence of majority status
other than the results of a Board election. 80
Thus, the Board, at least at the time of this writing, is plainly on
the path out of the "thicket" marked by Gissel. It is unfortunate, how-
ever, that the decision is couched in terms of the impracticality of
ascertaining the employer's knowledge of majority status or its willing-
ness to have that issue determined by an election. The Board's decision
should have been based squarely on the finding that, in view of the
absence of unfair labor practices interfering with a fair election, the
employees should have the right to decide the issue for themselves
through the preferred method.
The two dissenting Board members read Gissel as applying its
election possibility test only in the event of employer unfair labor
practices.81 For all other purposes, they regard the pre-Gissel holdings
as still good law and would apply them. Thus, they would find an
8(a)(5) violation in Summer & Co. since the employer refused to recog-
nize the union, in the mistaken belief that its majority was tainted by
supervisory influence. Since this contention was unrelated to the union's
majority status, the refusal to bargain was deemed a violation. The con-
80 ld.
81 ld.
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clusion implicit in the dissent's reasoning was the classic good faith
doubt test that since the employer's assertion was unrelated to the
union's majority, the employer had no good faith doubt. The dissent
later made this return to Joy Silk explicit when it stated "nor was the
employer's refusal to bargain at any time based upon an asserted doubt
of majority."8' 2 Thus, the dissent would apply Gissel's weighing of alter-
natives only when employer unfair labor practices make the normally
superior election process of questionable reliability. Where there are no
unfair labor practices, however, and the election process stands in un-
questioned superiority in ascertaining employee choice, the dissenters
would inquire into the employer's doubt of the union majority status
or its asserted reasons for refusal.
The confusions implicit in the current divergence of views are
manifest. Gissel's current application is based on a bare majority and
grounded on the tenuous rationale of practicality. Under these circum-
stances we might yet see another Board policy ostensibly "laid to
rest . . . only to be resurrected, like the Phoenix, garbed in slightly
different plumage. 8 3
82 Id. at 1311.
83 Bok at 39.
